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CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND THE "TERM CREEP" PROBLEM
Michael Allan Wolf*
INTRODUCTION
It has become apparent over the past several years that the decision to assign
the label "easement" to conservation restrictions-designed to preserve and protect
environmentally sensitive and productive agricultural lands, precious open space,
and historically and architecturally significant lands and structures-has caused
problems that most likely were not anticipated by those responsible for
conceptualizing and popularizing this important and ubiquitous tool.' Judges and
commentators have wrestled with important questions concerning the application
of common law concepts such as merger and cy pres to the statutory creation we
know as "conservation easements." 2 There is also serious concern that other
traditional principles and rules applicable to common law servitudes will make it
more difficult for conservation easements to render their important service in
perpetuity, given local and even global changes such as climate change and sea
level rise. 3 Conservation easements designed to protect critical habitat of protected
* 0 2013 Michael Allan Wolf. Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law,
University of Florida Levin College of Law. The Author thanks Nancy McLaughlin for her
careful reading of an initial draft, her perceptive comments, and her authoritative guidance;
and the impressive set of experts she gathered together for a symposium, Perpetual
Conservation Easements, at the Wallace Stegner Center on February 15, 2013. The Author
also thanks Danaya Wright, railroad easement expert extraordinaire, for her insights.
1 Wyoming was the lakt of the fifty states to enact conservation or preservation
restriction legislation. See infra notes 42-43; see POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ch. 34A
(Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2013).
2 See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. 116, 119 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2010)
(merger); Carpenter v. Comm'r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001 (2012) (cy pres); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Merger, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 279 (2011); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV, 422 (2005) (cy pres); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.5 (2000) (cy pres); UNIF. CONSERVATION
EASEMENT ACT § 3 cmt, 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/conservationeasement/uceafinal_81 %20with%2007amends.pdf (cy pres).
3 See, e.g., James L. Olmsted, The Butterfly Effect: Conservation Easements, Climate
Change, and Invasive Species, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41, 59 (2011) ("One of the
most complicated aspects of drafting perpetual conservation easements in the age of global
warming is the tension between the need for flexible amendments to address potential
future global warming scenarios, and amendment provisions that are so open-ended they
can cause the termination of an easement by loss of perpetuity."); Jessica Owley,
Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
199, 200 (2011) ("Where climate change leads to conflicts between the written
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species from development, to prevent the filling of wetlands, and to maintain
longstanding agricultural use, for example, are vulnerable to such climate-related
effects as shifts in habitat ranges, unprecedented coastal and inland flooding,
dramatically altered growing patterns, saltwater intrusion, and supercharged
tropical storms and hurricanes. Will there be any way to modify and thereby save
these easements so that they can serve equally important (though technically
different) public purposes?
It is true that some, even many, of the problems facing a wide range of
conservation easements have little or nothing to do with the name by which they
are identified in legal documents, statutes, and case law.4 Nevertheless, we can
identify and anticipate enough instances in which a simple change in nomenclature
would avoid unnecessary complications. Moreover, the nomenclature problem
posed by these legislatively created hybrids of property, trust, and tax law might
just be the canary in the coal mine that alerts the conservation and preservation
community to the greater need to explore a new generation of conservation
restrictions-one that will be suited to the legal, social, economic, ecological, and
climatic realities of the twenty-first century and, it is hoped, beyond.'
This Essay is divided into four parts, the first of which discusses the "term
creep" problem that has long plagued the Anglo-American common law of real
property. By term creep I mean the tendency of common law courts (and in turn
commentators and legislators) to use the same label to describe two or more
conceptually discrete, though related, concepts. The confusion between easements
of the "traditional" and "conservation" varieties-with its attendant negative
externalities-is just one in a long line of situations in which the decision to allow
often significantly dissimilar concepts to share the same name has led to
unfortunate consequences. It would be most unwise to allow easements to suffer
the same fate as trespass, nuisance, and adverse possession-three of the more
prominent fields of law serving as cautionary tales for proponents of conservation
restrictions.
In the second part, I explain the substantive nature of the hybrids known most
familiarly as conservation easements. Statutory and uniform law drafters who
piggy-backed on the early efforts of practitioners and government officials anxious
conservation easements and the landscapes they burden, it is not clear what the
implications are for the continued viability of conservation easements.").
4 For example, the names by which the restrictions are identified are irrelevant to
questions raised in federal taxation cases. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing
and Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment
After Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012).
5 There has been some movement of late to update statutory law in this area. See, e.g.,
Jeff Pidot, Conservation Easement Reform: As Maine Goes Should the Nation Follow?, 74
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (2011). The Maine reforms were later adopted in substantial
part in Rhode Island. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3(f)(4) (2012).
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to preserve view corridors6 and to provide other benefits for which traditional
servitudes proved inadequate-chiefly and most importantly the drafters of the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA)-were straightforward in their
efforts to cherrypick the best attributes of traditional servitudes, while discarding
troublesome disabilities, in order to achieve their admirable legislative goals.
Fortunately, this is not an area in which the wheel needs to be reinvented, as the
federal tax law already provides a clear, functional, descriptive term that carries
none of the term-creep baggage-perpetual conservation restrictions. The fact that
a significant percentage of conservation "easements" are created to meet federal
tax eligibility criteria provides even further support for a smooth shift to a less
problematic label.
The third part of this essay asks why proponents of conservation restrictions
should care about term creep. The answer lies both in the serious substantive
implications resulting from judicial and legislative confusion over easement
terminology and in the potential for what I call the boomerang effect-that is,
changes in traditional easement law caused by the failure of judges to perceive that
there are meaningful, outcome-determinative differences between actual and
"metaphorical" easements.
In the final section of this Essay, I explore three benefits that outweigh the
burdens of removing "easement" or "servitude" from the name of conservation
restrictions and adopting the terminology used in the federal tax arena. First, by a
simple shift in usage-from conservation easement to perpetual conservation
restriction (PCR) (or nonperpetual conservation restriction (NCR)), state
legislators can avoid the term creep and boomerang phenomena along with their
attendant negative effects. Second, by adopting a functional, descriptive label
(such as that employed in federal tax regulations), state legislators will associate
this important tool with its basic purpose-use restriction-rather than with an
abstract real property interest in land with which laypersons may have only a
passing familiarity. Third, and most importantly, by disassociating PCRs and
NCRs from some aspects of traditional easement and servitude law, state
legislators will disconnect their handiwork from any real property rules and
principles that fail to take into account the public purpose and investment strategies
of such instruments and that could lead to, for example, inappropriate
interpretations, terminations, and remedies. Applying such rules to PCRs and
NCRs could also have profound consequences for the traditional easement.
6 For an interesting history of the use of conservation restrictions, see Federico
Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers Should Know (and Care)
About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. REP.
10223 (2004). Apparently, William H. Whyte is responsible for coining the troublesome,
though extremely popular, term "conservation easement." See id. at 10224 nn. 11-12.
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I. A ROSE IS NOT A ROSE: THE TERM CREEP PROBLEM THAT PLAGUES
THE COMMON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
The common law system of real property that Americans inherited from the
British was already burdened by the fact that in several important doctrinal areas
the same word was used to label a related, though significantly distinguishable,
legal principle. The discussion that follows identifies only some of the more
prominent examples of this term creep phenomenon in American real property
law.' While considering these examples, the reader should consider how an ounce
in terminology-shift prevention might have eliminated a pound of confusion.
A. Trespassing "Trespass"
While the origins of the common law trespass action (a discussion of which is
beyond the bounds of this Essay) remain murky, the confusion regarding the
meaning of the term "trespass" is clear and problematic. Over the past several
hundred years, trespass has encompassed criminal prosecutions, as well as tort
actions to protect persons, real property, personal property, and even property in
cyberspace.9 While all forms of trespass have in common the idea of protecting
persons and property from interference and invasion, the differences among the
various criminal and civil variations on the term far outweigh the similarities.
Complicating matters even further is the fact that the terms "trespass" and
"trespass on the case" were used to describe two distinct categories of tort. As
William J. Prosser, the dean of late-twentieth century torts, explained,
Trespass was the remedy for all forcible, direct and immediate
injuries, whether to person or to property-or in other words, for the kind
of conduct likely to lead to a breach of the peace by provoking
immediate retaliation. Trespass on the case, or the action on case, as it
came to be called, developed somewhat later, as a supplement to the
7 Other nominees for term creep from real property law would include "merger"
(found in future interests and servitudes law) and "privity" (found in adverse possession
and servitudes law).
8 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 28 (4th ed. 1971)
("The origins of the law of torts are 'secreted in the interstices of procedure."' (quoting
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883)); 9
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 64A.0 1 [1] ("The specific origin of the action
in trespass is unclear.").
9 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the
Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REv. 265 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. 'CHI. L. REv. 73
(2003).
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parent action of trespass, designed to afford a remedy for obviously
wrongful conduct resulting in injuries which were not forcible or direct.'0
Eventually, and luckily for future generations of law students and lawyers, the
development of the modem law of negligence obviated the need to distinguish
between trespass and trespass on the case."
The late twentieth century witnessed the development of a new usage:
cybertrespass, a term that has proved to be a fertile source of judge-made and
statutory law as well as heated academic debate. 12 This metaphorical use of
trespass, a word traditionally associated with corporeal invasion, has created
additional problems, as we shall see later in this Essay.
B. Making a Nuisance Out of "Nuisance"
Probably the most egregious example of term creep in the property realm
involves the word "nuisance." Dean Prosser memorably threw up his hands and
proclaimed, "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all people, and
has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to
a cockroach baked in a pie."13
As with "trespass," the term "nuisance" encompasses criminal and civil
wrongs-public nuisance and private nuisance, respectively. 14 Adding insult to
injury, modem nuisance law provides for the possibility of recovering damages
(payable to the plaintiff, not to the state, in the form of a fine) as compensation for
special injuries suffered by victims of a public nuisance.' 5
"0 PROSSER, supra note 8, at 28-29.
See id. at 29 ("Because of the greater convenience of the action [case], it came to be
used quite generally in all cases of negligence, while trespass remained as the remedy for
the greater number of intentional wrongs.").
12 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 9; Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy
of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and
Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000).
' PROSSER, supra note 8, at 571.
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (1977) (noting that the word
"nuisance" is used to refer to "private and public nuisances"); 9 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 64.01 [1] (discussing confusion caused by availability of private
and public nuisance actions).
'5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 A ("In order to recover damages in an
individual action for a public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different
from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the
general public that was the subject of interference."); 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 1, § 64.07[4] ("[O]nly a plaintiff whose injuries or damages are special in kind, as
distinguished from special in degree, may sue for his or her own injuries under the public
nuisance doctrine.").
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The drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts addressed the difficulty
posed by the use of the same word to denote two legal principles in this fashion:
In this Restatement, it is necessary to make use of the word
nuisance, since there is no other word that will include both public and
private nuisances and will avoid constant repetitions of cumbersome
language defining both.... [A]s it is used in the Restatement,'nuisance"
does not signify any particular kind of conduct on the part of the
defendant. Instead, the word has reference to two particular kinds of
harm-the invasion of two kinds of interests-by conduct that is tortious
only if it falls into the usual categories of tort liability.16
Courts and commentators have long struggled with the confusion caused by the
double duty rendered by this unfortunate legal homophone.
C. Exorcising "Adverse Possession"
The line separating real and personal property is easily crossed, often to the
detriment of sound doctrine. 17 That has certainly been the case with adverse
possession. The American variation of the English theme of prescriptive title
yielded a judicial/legislative blend that put the burden on the trespasser to establish
ownership by making open and notorious, exclusive, hostile, and continuous use of
the realty for a set statutory period. 18 The inability to prove any of these elements
would result in a failed claim to new title. By the nineteenth century, we find
examples of American courts applying the same adverse possession principles and
terminology to possessors of items of moveable personal property.' 9
Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, a number of state courts
attempted to put a stop to this form of term creep. Recognizing that the elements of
adverse possession-particularly open and notorious use-operated much
differently in the realm of personalty, these courts explored alternative theories that
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 A, cmt. c.
17 See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils of
(Mis)reasoning by Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1355 (2000) (discussing difficulties with
applying real property doctrines to joint tenancy bank accounts and adverse possession of
personal property).
18 See 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 91.02 ("To establish title by
adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate actual, open and notorious, exclusive,
continuous and hostile possession of the premises for the prescribed statutory period often
under a claim of right or color of title.").
19 Some of those cases unfortunately and shamefully involved a certain kind of
American personal property: human beings. See, e.g., Lucas v. Daniels, 34 Ala. 188 (Ala.
1859); Pryor v. Rayburn, 16 Ark. 671 (Ark. 1856); Horn v. Gartman, I Fla. 63 (Fla. 1846).
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were more protective of the original owner, such as the discovery rule that derived
from tort law. 20
There is a second area of confusion regarding the term "adverse possession"
that crops up in court decisions, as some judges have used the label to describe the
successful acquisition of a prescriptive easement. Despite the attempt by
blackletter sources to make clear that a successful adverse possession results in
actual, legal title for the claimant, while prescription results in a right in land (an
easement), some judges use adverse possession terminology in the easement
context. 21
D. (P)restating "Servitudes"
American servitudes law is rife with confusion-some, but not all, of which is
attributable to terminology. Courts and commentators have long wrestled with the
distinctions between licenses and easements, real covenants and equitable
servitudes, negative easements and restrictive covenants, and so on.22 Generations
of American law students, for example, have struggled in vain to distinguish a
negative easement from a restrictive covenant.2 3 The American Law Institute's
flawed effort to unify this problematic area (the Third Restatement of Property,
Servitudes) has so far failed to break down many of these barriers,24 which is not
surprising given the meaningful distinctions that gave rise to non-uniformity in the
first place.
There are sui generis puzzles as well, particularly the aberration known as the
''railroad easement" or "railroad right-of-way," which has attributes of a present
estate, a servitude, and a future interest all rolled into one bewildering ball. As
20 The leading example is O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 876 (N.J. 1980) ("The
discovery rule permits an equitable accommodation of the rights of the parties without
establishing a rule of law fraught with uncertainty.").
21 See, e.g., Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262, 1270 (Colo. 2008) ("Hence, the
elements of a claim to terminate an easement by adverse possession mirror the elements of
a claim to create an easement by adverse possession.").
22 The clarion call in, the revolt designed to end servitudes complexity was Uriel
Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (1982).
23 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2, cmt. h ("Negative
easements are restrictive covenants.").
24 See, e.g., Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement
(Third) of Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 755 (2011)
("The Third Restatement purports to restate rather than revise the law. Still, courts and
commentators have not embraced it, suggesting that it does not truly reflect the law. Courts
generally have not cited to the Third Restatement's more revisionist sections. Critical
commentators range from those who think it does not go far enough in adopting a contract
approach to those who find merit in the old approach." (footnotes omitted)); see also Note,
Touch and Concern, The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122
HARv. L. REv. 938, 938 (2009) ("This Note argues that courts are correct in not embracing
the Restatement's new approach . . . .").
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Professor Danaya Wright has explained in her authoritative treatment of the law
regarding rails-to-trails conversion,
As a practical matter, railroads needed a property interest that was
more substantial than a mere common-law easement. They needed
exclusive control over the land, particularly the ability to fence it in order
to keep landowners and their livestock off the road. They needed the
right to dig tunnels and drainage ditches, alter the elevation, and pour
creosote and herbicides on the land. They needed to limit grade
crossings, and they obviously needed enough control to limit others from
using the roadbed. The reality of railroad usage is that it was an
extremely intensive use, a use that for the vast majority of nineteenth-
century grantors and railroad land agents implicitly necessitated a fee
simple grant.25
As we have seen before, the use of familiar terminology in an unfamiliar
setting has led to needless confusion-in courts, legislatures, and law offices.
Again, we can turn to Professor Wright for guidance through this thicket:
Although the modern trend seems to be to interpret "right-of-way"
simply to mean an easement, courts have agreed that the railroad
easement is a unique and difficult-to-define property right that does not
clearly fit into the easement or fee categories. As the Supreme Court has
noted: "A railroad right-of-way is a very substantial thing. It is more than
a mere right of passage. It is more than an easement." But it is not a fee.
It has been called a "limited fee," a "perpetual easement," a "right-of-
way easement," and an "exclusive easement," but no court has clearly
indicated the differences, if any, between these terms. Initially the courts
seemed more likely to interpret ambiguous deeds for "railroad right-of-
way" to be some form of defeasible fee. But by the early twentieth
century, both federal and state courts had turned toward labeling the
interest as an exclusive easement rather than a defeasible fee.2 6
Unfortunately, the ramifications of term creep in this area can be serious, for they
can spell the difference between the survival of a rail banking scheme for the
benefit of the public or a successful takings claim for a distant successor-in-interest
of a remote grantor.27
25 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 78A.06[3][b] (footnotes omitted)
(Chapter 78 was written by Professor Wright).
26 Id. § 78A.07[1][a] (quoting W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 U.S.
540, 570 (1904)) (footnotes omitted).
27 See id. § 78A. 13 (discussing rails-to-trails takings cases).
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II. THE CONSERVATION HYBRID
Properly understood, conservation easements (even those that do not carry the
specific name) are in fact hybrids that contain elements of servitude, future
interest, taxation, and charitable trust law. While these kinds of restrictions existed
in pre-statutory regimes, today conservation easements are very much creatures of
state (and to some extent federal) legislation and regulation. Legislative drafters,
particularly the framers of the UCEA (a project of the National Conference of
Commissions of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)), strove to adopt some of the
strengths of traditional servitude law and at the same time eliminate some of the
weakest elements that often enervate traditional common-law servitudes.
According to the institutional history of the uniform act, the decision to use
common-law terminology to label this hybrid was a conscious one. In a meeting on
August 10, 1979, to consider what was then called the Uniform Conservation and
Historic Preservations Agreements Act, Russell L. Brenneman-who served as
one of the Reporters along with then New York University law professor John
Costonis-reported to the Committee of the Whole that "some new nomenclature
is in the Draft Acts. We have called this thing a conservation or historic
preservation agreement, for want of a better term."2 8 In response, Rupert Bullivant,
who presented the act to the assembled experts, observed that "[w]ith respect to the
nomenclature, the Committee is badly at sea, and I think our Advisors are as
well." 29 He also noted that "there has been another suggestion for a title known as
'resources conservation covenant,"' 30 a suggestion that, should it have been
accepted, would have presented its own term creep challenges. It is apparent from
this document that, even among those with experience in this emerging field,
terminology was quite fluid and non-uniform.3 1
By the end of 1979, a new draft was prepared, carrying a new title: Uniform
Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement Act. The first comment on
Section 1 (the section that defined "conservation easement" and "preservation
easement") provided this explanation for the shift:
The issue of terminology is not free of difficulty, and the states have
adopted various approaches, including the terms "easement,"
"restriction," and "agreement." The Act elects "easement" in order to
28 Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of
the Whole Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation Agreements Act 13 (Aug. 10,
1979) (on file with author).
291 Id. at 19.
30 Id.
3 See, e.g., id. at 42 (statement of K. King Bumett) ("I think that it's very hard, when
you aren't familiar with what these easements are for and how they work, for people to
grasp, sometimes, the problem that really exists. Actually, this is a very conservative
notion-this statute-in allowing the creation of these covenants. It is completely in
keeping with our traditional notions in this country." (emphasis added)).
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make clear that the intention is not to create an entirely new interest in
land but rather to eliminate certain common law defenses under a defined
set of circumstances. The critical questions are the enforceability of the
interest if it is held in gross, its assignability if it is so held, whether the
burden of a negative interest "runs," and whether interest of a "novel"
type will be recognized. The term "easement" is satisfactory if the Act
specifically addresses the particular problems arising out of that concept
in this context, as the Act does. It should further be noted that
"easement" is a prevailing nomenclature in existing statutes and in the
Internal Revenue Code.32
In this way, the drafters acknowledged the problem and offered two rationales for
the shift to easement terminology. First, it was their intent to present traditional
easements that would be strengthened by statutory modifications regarding their
enforceability. Second, state laws and the federal tax code were already using the
term "easement."
Subsequent developments cause us to question both of these rationales. First,
it has become apparent, as noted in the discussion below, that the UCEA as
promulgated did not "specifically address[ ] the particular problems arising out of
that concept."3 3 Indeed, the Prefatory Note and certain comments of the UCEA
have been amended to clarify issues regarding the use of the cy pres doctrine to
preserve restrictions despite changes in circumstances. 3 4 Second, there is a much
greater variety in the nomenclature found in state statutes today, while federal tax
regulations now employ different terminology as well.35
When the Committee of the Whole met again in July of 1980, Professor
Costonis offered an historical excursion through the thicket of English and
American servitudes law. He then explained that the Reporters and Committee
considered three alternatives:
The first was, we could try to cure the defects of all three common
law interests [covenants, easements, equitable servitudes]; that is, write
an Act which removed disabilities to equitable servitudes and to real
covenants . . . . We thought it added complexity, and we doubted we
would be successful in the effort, in any event. 36
32 UNIF. CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT ACT 3 (Draft, Dec.
21, 1979) (on file with author).
" Id. at 3.
34 See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Amendments to Unif.
Conservation Easement Act 3, 4, 5-6 (Feb. 3, 2007) (on file with author).
3s For a discussion of the history of tax code and regulatory changes, see infra notes
47-52 and accompanying text.
36 Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Proceedings in Committee of
the Whole Uniform Conservation and Preservation Easements Act 9 (July 27 and 29, 1980)
(on file with author).
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Given the daunting task of "purifying" traditional servitudes doctrines, the drafters
appear to have made a wise choice.
The second alternative, rejected by the repoiters and drafting committee,
was to sweep away the three common law interests and create a statutory
hybrid-you might call it a restriction-but in any event, it would be an
amalgam of the three interests, but in some unstated way it would be an
independent interest of its own. We thought, given the confusion in the
field, that, rather than multiplying additional concepts, we would reject
that.37
With all due respect to Professor Costonis and his distinguished colleagues, their
effort not to "create a statutory hybrid" was successful in name only, as their final
work product does indeed select characteristics of various servitudes, mixed with
related areas of real property law such as present estates and future interests and
charitable trusts. Moreover, the growing number of cases and commentary
questioning the applicability of common-law concepts to these "easements"
suggests strongly that their quest to avoid confusion, while ambitious, proved to be
quixotic.
Professor Costonis then described the third-and adopted-alternative as a
return
to the source-namely, to go back to the easement itself, which really is
the residual less-than-fee interest at common law-and to do what the
English common law did not do; namely, to open up the easement, so
that the disabilities that prevented it from being used for purposes such as
those considered in the Act would be removed.38
There were two chief improvements on age-old doctrines--(1) "recognizing that
new kinds of interests, other than the five mentioned in common law, could be the
subject matter of an easement;" 39 and (2) "recogniz[ing] that an easement could
impose affirmative duties on the holder." 40 Of course, if the drafters had chosen
different terminology they could still have imbued their hybrid with these
important attributes.
One year later, the final version of what was then renamed the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act featured a "Commissioner's Prefatory Note" with
language that tracked closely with Professor Costonis's explanation, with a few
relatively minor additions:
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. It appears from earlier in his talk that Professor Costonis is referring to
restrictions on the types of negative easements under traditional English law. See id. at 7.
40 Id. at 10.
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The easement alternative is favored in the Act for three reasons.
First, lawyers and courts are most comfortable with easements and
easement doctrine, less so with restrictive covenants and equitable
servitudes, and can be expected to experience severe confusion if the Act
opts for a hybrid fourth interest. Second, the easement is the basic less-
than-fee interest at common law; the restrictive covenant and the
equitable servitude appeared only because of then-current, but now
outdated, limitations of easement doctrine.* Finally, non-possessory
interests satisfying the requirements of covenant real or equitable
servitude doctrine will invariably meet the Act's less demanding
requirements as "easements." Hence, the Act's easement orientation
should not prove prejudicial to instruments drafted as real covenants or
equitable servitudes although the converse would not be true. 41
The attention that this Essay pays to the framing of the UCEA is warranted
for two important reasons. First, it is an invaluable source of information regarding
the thought process that important figures in the field went through during this
crucial period in the development of the conservation restriction concept. Second,
the UCEA has been a successful project, as evidenced by its adoption (along with
its easement terminology) by lawmakers in twenty-one states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.42 Of the twenty-nine remaining states that have
legislation pertaining to conservation and preservation restrictions, all but nine use
easement or servitude nomenclature.43
41 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, at prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008).
42 Legislative Fact Sheet-Conservation Easement Act, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Conservation%20Easement%
20Act (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). The states that have adopted the UCEA are Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. With the exception of New Mexico, which uses the term
"land use easement," all of the jurisdictions adopting the UCEA employ the term
"conservation easement." See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12-1 (2012) ("This act may be cited
as the 'Land Use Easement Act."').
43 Other states using the word "easement" among non-UCEA states include
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (West 2012)
("conservation easement"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (2012) ("conservation
easements in gross"); FLA. STAT. § 704.06 (2012) ("conservation easements"); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 198-1 (2012) ("conservation easement"); IOWA CODE § 457A.1 (2012)
("conservation easements"); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 2-118 (West 2012)
("conservation easements"); MICH. CoMP., LAWS § 324.2140 (2012) ("conservation
easement" and "historic preservation easement"); MO. REV. STAT. § 67.880 (2012)
("development right or restrictive covenant, -conservation easement, covenant or other
contractual right"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-201 (2012) ("conservation easements");
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A. UCEA as Cherrypicking
The UCEA framers, like their counterparts in several state legislatures, sought
to bolster conservation easements by imparting to this legislative hybrid the best of
what servitudes law had to offer. Conservation easements would be as strong as
appurtenant easements without the need for a dominant tenement. Unlike
noncommercial easements in gross and licenses, conservation easements are
assignable. While negative easements were traditionally limited to a few varieties,
this legislative hybrid is not; nor do the traditional limitations on affirmative
covenants have effect. While real covenants and equitable servitudes need to touch
and concern land, the same is not true of their hybrid cousin. And privity, the
bugbear of the first year property student struggling with the black letter law of
real covenants, is not required for conservation easements. 44
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,111 (2012) ("conservation easement" and "preservation
easement"); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303 (McKinney 2012) ("conservation
easement"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08 (2012) ("historic easements"); OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. § 5301.67 ("conservation easement" and "agricultural easement"); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 271.715 (2012) ("conservation easement" and "highway scenic preservation easement");
32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5053 (2012) ("conservation easement" and "preservation
easement"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-56 (2012) ("conservation easement"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-9-303 (2012) ("conservation easement"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-1
(West 2012) ("conservation easement"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 325a (2012)
("conservation easement"); W. VA. CODE § 20L12-3 (2012) ("conservation easement" and
"preservation easement"). The nine states that, with the endorsement of the author of this
Essay, do not use easement nomenclature are Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
Washington. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42a (2012) ("conservation restriction" and
"preservation restriction"); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1 (2012), ("conservation right"); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1272 (2012) ("conservation servitude"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184,
§ 31 (2012) ("conservation restriction," "preservation restriction," "agricultural
preservation restriction," "watershed preservation restriction," and "affordable housing
restriction"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:45 (2012) ("conservation restriction,"
"preservation restriction," and "agricultural preservation restriction"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:8B-2 (West 2012) ("conservation restriction" and "historic preservation restriction");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35 (2012) ("conservation agreement" and "preservation
agreement"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-2 (2012) ("conservation restriction" and
"preservation restriction"); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.130 (2012) ("development right,
easement, covenant, restriction, or other right, or any interest less than the fee simple, to
protect, preserve, maintain, improve, restore, limit the future use of, or conserve for open
space purposes").
44 See, e.g., UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 4 ("A conservation easement is valid
even though: (1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property; (2) it can be or has
been assigned to another holder; (3) it is not of a character that has been recognized
traditionally at common law; (4) it imposes a negative burden; (5) it imposes affirmative
obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened property or upon the holder; (6)
the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or (7) there is no privity of estate or of
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Any lawyer or judge who is familiar with the servitudes concepts addressed in
a traditional American real property class will be able to perceive that the
"conservation easement" is, for many purposes, an easement in name only. And
that is the problem; the name "easement" is misleading, despite any caveats or
explanations to the contrary in the legislative text, comments, or history. Litigators
seeking -to prevail in a dispute regarding the creation, legitimacy, survival, or
termination of a conservation restriction will not (and, in the name of zealous
advocacy, perhaps should not) hesitate to take advantage of a favorable easement
doctrine that is not directly addressed in a relevant "conservation easement" statute
in an attempt to prevail in their disputes. Given the regrettable record of term creep
in real property law, it is probably asking too much of the members of our over-
burdened judiciary (many of whom are decades away from their initial
introduction to servitudes law) to perceive the outcome-determinative difference
between a "real" easement and the statutory hybrid bearing the same name.
B. The Tax Tail and the Conservation Dog
A significant number of conservation restrictions in effect in the United States
today were eligible for favorable federal or state tax treatment.45 This is by no
means coincidental, as evidenced by the overabundance of federal tax and circuit
court decisions in which the Internal Revenue Service has challenged taxpayers'
use of this strategy to reduce their tax bottom line. I will leave it to others to
analyze the holdings and rationales of this expanding line of cases.4 6 The most
relevant aspect of the tax treatment of conservation easements for purposes of this
Essay lies in the terminology featured in federal tax law.
The Uniform Commissioners were not the only lawyers charged with drafting
responsibility in the conservation restriction area. Since the 1970s, those
responsible for crafting provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and
Treasury regulations have experimented with various formulations to describe the
kind of partial property interests that qualify for favorable tax treatment. In 1976,
IRC § 170(f)(3), regarding "income tax deductions for charitable contributions of
partial interests in property for conservation purposes," provided the following list
of eligible less-than-fee interests: "(iii) a lease on, option to purchase, or easement
contract."). While there are some variations, this language appears in most UCEA states.
See statutes cited supra note 43 for variations in adopting jurisdictions.
45 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century:
What Have We Learned and Where Should We Go From Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV., 687,
tbl.2, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2013) (showing the number of conservation and fagade
easements for which taxpayers claimed federal tax benefits from 2003 through 2009).
46 See, e.g., 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 34A.04 (2013 revision
by Professor McLaughlin); McLaughlin, supra note 4; Martin J. McMahon, Ira B. Shepard
& Daniel L. Simmons, Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2012,
13 FLA. TAX REV. 503, 652-68 (2013) (discussing the tax perspective of several
conservation easement cases).
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with respect to real property of not less than 30 years' duration . . . and (iv) a
remainder interest in real property . . . ." The following year, congressional
drafters eliminated the deduction with regard to term interests, but kept
"easements" in the mix: "(iii) a lease on, option to purchase, or easement with
respect to real property granted in perpetuity."48
In December 1980, only a few months after Professor Costonis presented his
defense of the decision to use the term "easement," federal lawmakers moved in a
different direction. They settled on the current version of the key language in what
is now § 170(h), defining what § 170(f) now refers to as a "qualified conservation
contribution." The subject matter of the contribution is now referred to as "a
qualified real property interest," a term that in turn is defined as
any of the following interests in real property:
(A) the entire interest of the donor other than a qualified mineral
interest,
(B) a remainder interest, and
(C) a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be
made of the real property.4 9
While the language "conservation easement" has by no means been deleted from
the tax code,so a significant precedent had been set as early as 1980 for the notion
that a workable description of conservation and historic preservation restrictions
could be devised without using common law servitudes terms.
In 1983, the Treasury Department proposed regulations to accompany IRC
§ 170(f), introducing the descriptor "perpetual conservation restriction." 5 ' The
final regulations that appeared three years later featured the same nomenclature:
Perpetual conservation restriction. A perpetual conservation
restriction is a qualified real property interest. A "perpetual conservation
restriction" is a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which may be
made of real property-including, an easement or other interest in real
47 An Act to Reform the Tax Laws of the United States, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 280 B.,
90 Stat. 1520 (Oct. 4, 1976).
48 An Act to Reduce Individual and Business Income Taxes and to Provide Tax
Simplification and Reform, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 309, 91 Stat. 154 (May 23, 1977).
49 An Act to Extend Certain Temporary Tax Provisions, and for Other Purposes, Pub.
L. No. 96-541, § 6, 94 Stat. 3206 (Dec. 17, 1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 170(h)(2) (2012))
(emphasis added).
50 See I.R.C. § 2031(c) (discussing estate tax implications ofa "qualified conservation
easement," whose meaning is equated with "a qualified conservation contribution (as
defined in section 170(h)(1) of a qualified real property interest (as defined in section
I70(h)(2)(C)))").
5' Qualified Conservation Contribution; Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,940
(May 23, 1983) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 25).
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property that under state law has attributes similar to an easement (e.g., a
restrictive covenant or equitable servitude). For purposes of this section,
the terms "easement", "conservation restriction", and "perpetual
conservation restriction" have the same meaning. 52
The terminology currently used in the regulations-"perpetual conservation
restriction"-has three major advantages over "conservation easement." This
phrase (like the alternative "nonperpetual conservation restriction") comprises a
(1) descriptively accurate, (2) functional definition that (3) carries none of the
potentially confusing and problematic common-law baggage of terms such as
"conservation easements," "conservation servitudes," and the like.
III. WHY WE SHOULD CARE:
THE POWER OF WORDS IN A COMMON-LAW SYSTEM
At its essence, law is verbal, developing word-by-word and phrase-by-phrase,
as courts add patinas onto the original brass. Lawyers and judges devote
inestimable amounts of time, effort, and brainpower to the interpretation and
manipulation of words and phrases. In the realms of statutory and constitutional
law, the search for the framers' intent and original understanding often play a
significant interpretative role that supplement exegesis of important texts. In the
realm of the common law, whose foggy origins are associated with the convenient
myth of unchanging truths from the too distant past, the words embodying the
concepts (such as nuisance, trespass, and easement) take on even more
significance, and there is perhaps an even greater need for vigilance regarding term
creep.
A. Problem Areas Resulting from Treatment as an Easement: An Illustrative List
It is beyond the intent and scope of this Essay to provide an exhaustive
catalogue of current and potential problems posed by judicial treatment of
"conservation easements" as real, traditional easements. Instead, it will be helpful
to review three illustrative examples of the hazards of term creep in this highly
sensitive and important area. The first two problems have already been raised in
reported cases and discussed in the growing conservation easement literature. The
third is a serious, potential problem that could easily appear in future court
challenges.
The first problem area involves the termination of conservation easements
under the doctrine of merger, which is a traditional mode for terminating common
law servitudes .53 While most conservation-restriction statutes do not specifically
52 See Income Taxes: Qualified Conservation Contributions, 51 Fed. Reg. 1,496 (Jan.
14, 1986) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 1.170A-14(2)).
5 See, e.g., 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 34.22[1] ("An easement,
by definition, is an interest in land that is in the possession of another . . .. This prerequisite
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address the topic of merger, 54 a few do." Most courts are thus left on their own to
solve this puzzle.5 6 There seems to be little logic and a lot of bad public policy
behind application of this traditional rule to easements that are designed to be
perpetual and in the public interest.5 7 The identity of the owner of the property
subject to a conservation restriction is irrelevant to the purpose of the restriction. It
would be unfortunate if the grantor's intent were frustrated by a government or
nonprofit holder that had the good fortune of being the beneficiary of a partial
situation ceases to exist when the owner of an easement in gross becomes the owner of the
servient tenement or when the dominant and servient tenements of an appurtenant easement
come into the same ownership. In each instance, the owner of the easement, having become
the owner of the servient tenement, has, as such owner of the servient tenement, rights of
user greater than those comprised in the easement itself. The lesser is swallowed by the
greater and the easement is, under the majority view, permanently terminated by this
merger." (footnote and citation omitted)). Merger will terminate covenants enforceable at
law and equity as well. See id. § 60.10[1].
54 Section 2 of the UCEA provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this Act, a
conservation easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified,
terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements." UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a), 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008).
5 Colorado and Utah statutes specify that merger is a valid method of termination.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-107 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-5 (2012).
Maine's statute provides otherwise. See ME. REV. STAT. 33, § 479 (2012). In Maine, the
conservation easement will be valid even if
[t]he title to the real property subject to the conservation easement has been
acquired by the holder, unless the holder, with the consent of any 3rd party with
rights of enforcement, replaces the conservation easement with legally binding
restrictions under a conservation easement or declaration of trust at least as
protective of the conservation values of the protected property as provided by
the replaced easement.
Id.
56 See, e.g., Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Malawer, 80 Va. Cir. 116, 119 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2010) ("[S]uch easements are not subject to the typical common law analysis of merger as
would be appropriate to rights of way between two adjoining tracts.").
5 See also Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 11-140 (Aug. 31, 2012) ("[A] conservation
easement... is not extinguished by application of the common law doctrine of
merger...."); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of
Merger, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 279 (2011) ("This article explains that merger
generally should not occur in such cases because the unity of ownership that is required for
the doctrine to apply typically will not be present. For merger to occur, 'the two estates
must be in the same person at the same time and in the same right.' If the government or
nonprofit holder of a conservation easement subsequently acquires title to the encumbered
land, the two estates will be 'in the same person at the same time,' but they generally will
not be held 'in the same right."'). While I commend the Virginia Attorney General and
Professor McLaughlin on their analyses, I am not confident that courts, without clear
guidance from state lawmakers, will rule consistently in the public interest.
804 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 3
118 UTAH ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. 33 No. I
interest in year one, and in year twenty of the underlying fee, particularly if that
entity, which would n'ow own the property free of restrictions, sought to sell it. for
development, trade it for another parcel, or otherwise use the property for non-
conservation purposes.
The second area of concern involves the fact that charitable trust principles do
not generally apply to servitudes. While the NCCUSL has addressed this issue
both in the original comments to the UCEA and in the recent amendments to the
Prefatory Note and comments, " and while Professor Nancy McLaughlin's
scholarship has taken the lead in this area, 59 asking courts in a case involving an
interest identified as an easement to overlook changed conditions as profound as
the effect of climate change on the critical habitat of an endangered species,60 may
well be asking too much. Courts distracted by the common-law rules normally
applicable to servitudes might also fail to recognize the fiduciary obligations
requiring government and nonprofit holders to administer these "easements"
consistent with their stated terms and charitable conservation purposes on behalf of
donors, funders, and the public, as well as the authority of certain state attorneys
general to bring suit against a holder who fails to meet these obligations.
The third troublesome issue involves the set of remedies available when
conservation restrictions are breached. The public interest, which is inextricably
connected with these special legislative hybrids, demands a much more flexible set
of legal and equitable remedies than is normally available under the traditional
easement regime. The involvement of state attorneys general in the-enforcement of
conservation restrictions is a strong indication that this is not a good old-fashioned
servitude.6' Also, courts and commentators need to consider seriously whether it
58 See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 34.
59 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation
Easements, 29 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 422 (2005); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending
Perpetual Conservation Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1031 (2006) [hereinafter McLaughlin, Myrtle Grove Controversy]; Nancy A.
McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, Conservation Easements and the Charitable Trust
Doctrine: Setting the Record Straight, 10 WYo. L. REV. 73 (2010).
60See Olmsted, supra note 3, at 46 ("Isotherm maps become important when one
understands that one of the effects of global climate change will be the wholesale
migrations of entire species-and indeed entire biomes-as increases in average
temperatures in their native climes send them northward, in search of climates similar to
those in which they evolved."); Owley, supra note 3, at 202 ("As the climate changes,
ranges for ecosystems and viable species habitats will shift.").
61 See, e.g., Wooster v. Dept. of Fish & Game, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1020 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (involving California Attorney General defending validity of conservation
easement); N.J. v. Quaker Valley Farms, No. HNT-C-14007-08 (N.J. Super. Ct., Aug. 9,
2012) (involving New Jersey Attorney General suing to enforce conservation easement);
Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690, 695-96 (Me. 2009) ("The plain language
of [33 M.R.S.] section 478(1)(D) authorizes the State to intervene in an action that was
initiated by another party, as the State did in this case, and that affects a conservation
easement . . . .".); McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 59 (involving a suit in which
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makes sense and would be beneficial public policy to allow conservation
restrictions to be terminated by adverse possession or prescription, in the event the
owner of the underlying (servient) parcel should make continuous use of the
property to the adverse interests of the restriction holder, 62 or if a trespasser gains
title by fulfilling the elements of adverse possession. The modem trend is to
allow the statute of limitations to run in certain circumstances against public and
charitable owners, although there are exceptions.64 While public entities that own
Wyoming Attorney General objected to county's agreement to terminate conservation
easement at request of new owners of land was settled, leaving easement intact with minor
court-approved modifications); McLaughlin, Myrtle Grove Controversy, supra note 59
(involving a suit in which Maryland Attorney General objected to land trust's agreement to
"amend" conservation easement to allow upscale subdivision on property at request of new
owners of land settled leaving easement intact); see also UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT
ACT § 3 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008) ("[I]ndependently of the Act, the Attorney General
could have standing in his capacity as supervisor of charitable trusts, either by statute or at
common law."); Jeff Pidot, Conservation Easement Reform: As Maine Goes Should the
Nation Follow?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 20-21 (2011).
62 See, e.g., 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 34.21 (footnote and
citation omitted) ("The servient owner can extinguish an easement in whole or in part by
adverse uses continued for the prescriptive period. As in the case of the creation of an
easement by prescription, the uses must be adverse, continuous, uninterrupted, and for the
prescriptive period.")
63 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Kass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding
Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 308 (2006) ("Are
wild lands encumbered by conservation easements at risk of adverse possession? Although
the source of many potential easement violations comes from the owner of the underlying
fee property, interference with easement values can arise from neighbors or other third
parties engaging in development, fencing, harvesting or other prohibited activities on the
property. In theory, such activities could result in acquisition of some or all of the property
by adverse possession as that doctrine is applied to wild lands. However, because the
conservation organization has taken on the obligation of monitoring what might be remote
and relatively inaccessible property, the conservation organization is in a position to
prevent adverse possession of the property and thus minimize the risk of this common law
doctrine to lands enrolled in conservation easements."). One can safely speculate that the
more successful organizations become in obtaining even more conservation restrictions, the
greater the likelihood that they will be unable to monitor inconsistent activities by innocent
and purposeful intruders.
64 See, e.g., 16 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1,§ 91.11[2] ("In several
American jurisdictions, the rigor of the common-law barrier has been relaxed by statute. In
some states, this relaxation takes the form of allowing adverse possession against a
governmental entity, but the required time period is doubled or otherwise extended. In still
other states, statutes eliminate the common-law barrier completely, making governmental
entities and individuals subject to the same rules." (footnotes omitted)).
State statutory protection for charitable owners is rare. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.090
(2013) ("Nothing contained in any statute of limitation shall extend to any lands given,
granted, sequestered, or appropriated to any public, pious, or charitable use, or to any lands
belonging to this state."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-3-17 (2013) ("The provisions of
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the restrictions are in a stronger position than individual or charitable organization
owners, the risk of loss still remains, which suggests to this Author that state
lawmakers should at least debate the wisdom of providing statutory protections
from adverse possession and prescription.
B. The Boomerang Phenomenon: A Lesson from Cyberlaw
While the primary drawback of term creep lies in the needless confusion
resulting from using the same word to describe distinct concepts, there is a
secondary problem as well-the boomerang phenomenon. As the general editor of
a multi-volume, real property treatise, the Author feels protective (admittedly,
perhaps unreasonably so) about the discipline, and he is ever on the lookout for
reported decisions in which state and federal courts misapply precedents or
confuse basic concepts.
Imagine that Legal Concept A and Legal Concept B are known by the
identical term (such as "trespass" to land and "trespass" to personal property,
respectively). Now imagine that the law in Legal Concept B cases begins to take
on some of the doctrinal attributes of the law regarding Legal Concept A, for no
apparent reason other than the fact that the two concepts have the same name in
common. That is a classic risk posed by term creep. Now imagine that a court in a
Legal Concept B case makes an unprecedented (and perhaps unwise) leap and then
the same or another court subsequently cites this new Legal Concept B case with
approval in a Legal Concept A case, which has the effect of moving Legal Concept
A law in an unanticipated (and perhaps unwise) direction. When the second case
moves the law in a different direction, that is the boomerang phenomenon. The
court's misstep in the Legal Concept B case has come back to cause harm to the
logical and efficient doctrinal development in the law of Legal Concept A. An
example follows from the realm of trespass law.
On June 28, 1996, the Court of Appeal of California issued its ruling in
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 65 a computer-hacking case growing out of the
activities of two teenagers. After Thrifty-Tel discovered that the Bezenek teens had
run a computer "program between six and seven hours, generating over one
thousand three hundred calls,"66 the company filed an action "seeking damages for
conversion, fraud, and reasonable value of services." 67 Thrifty-Tel was successful
in the state trial court, receiving more than $33,000 in damages and $14,000 in
§§ 15-3-15 and 15-3-16 [on adverse possession] shall not extend to school lands or to lands
belonging to the United States or this state, or to religious or charitable societies, or to
lands held for a public purpose."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 462 (2012) ("Nothing
contained in this chapter shall extend to lands given, granted, sequestered or appropriated
to a public, pious or charitable use, or to lands belonging to the state.").
65 Thrifty-Tel Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).66 Id. at 1564.
67id.
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attorney's fees and costs. 68 The appellate court affirmed the substantive ruling on
tort law, but reversed and remanded on the question of damages. 6 9
The appellate court's discussion of the applicable tort theory is what started
the boomerang process. When the Bezeneks asserted that "the unauthorized use of
confidential codes to gain computer access did not give rise to a cause of action for
conversion,"70 arguing that in order to prevail the plaintiff would have to show that
the hackers took something tangible, the court of appeal found it "unnecessary to
resolve the question because the evidence supports the verdict on a trespass
theory."n
It is at this point that the plot thickens. Notice how, in a footnote, the court
makes an outcome-determinative leap from established and emerging law (on
trespass to land and personal property) to an intimation and then to an unsupported
proposition (regarding trespass in cyberspace):
At early common law, trespass required a physical touching of
another's chattel or entry onto another's land. The modern rule
recognizes an indirect touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a
cement plant that migrate onto another's real and personal property may
give rise to trespass. But the requirement of a tangible has been relaxed
almost to the point of being discarded. Thus, some courts [in 1985 and
1992] have held that microscopic particles or smoke may give rise to
trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated migrating
intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass, provided they do
not simply impede an owner's use or enjoyment of property, but cause
damage. In our view, the electronic signals generated by the Bezenek
boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of
action.72
The court was persuaded that a trespass to personal property had occurred and
quoted Dean Prosser's observation that "[t]respass to chattels survives today, in
other words, largely as a little brother of conversion." 73 In the following footnote,
the court acknowledged that "[a]pparently no California decision has applied a
trespass theory to computer hacking," but apparently found some support in dicta
from an Indiana case and a criminal "computer trespass" statute from the state of
Washington.74
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1572.
70 Id. at 1565.
71 Id. at 1566.
72 Id. at 1566 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 1566-67 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 85-86 (5th ed. 1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
74 Id. at 1567 n.7.
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The analysis of the Thrifty-Tel court is problematic in and of itself. Later that
same year, however, on November 19, 1996, three other judges serving on the
same court (Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal of California) cited
the computer-hacking trespass to personal property decision as precedent in a case
involving trespass to land. Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Group,75 concerned
damage to Elton's property caused by Anheuser-Busch's negligent failure to
prevent a fire that the company had set on the adjoining property. Unable to find a
"reason why a fire cannot constitute the agent by which a trespass is committed," 76
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that a trespass to land had
occurred, despite the fact that "no California case has previously decided that a fire
can constitute a trespassory invasion." 77
One of the building blocks underlying the court's move away from the
traditional distinction between direct and indirect invasions in trespass to land
cases78 was none other than the same court's precedent-deficient decision several
months before: "Even damaging electronic signals sent by a computer 'hacker' can
constitute a trespass to personalty." 79 A questionable development in trespass to
personal property law has thus contributed to a questionable development in
trespass to land law, and for no other apparent reason than the name they have in
common-boomerang!
This Author's fear is that problematic, emerging case law interpreting the
judicial hybrid known as a conservation "easement" will one day come back to
haunt and infect "real" easement law, in part because of the label that has been
attached to conservation restrictions. The attempt to unify servitudes law is
problematic enough. An even greater error than ignoring the meaningful
differences between easements, covenants, and licenses would be to apply the
attributes of legislatively reinforced PCRs or NCRs, created for conservation and
preservation purposes, to run-of-the mill easements that further purposes unrelated
to the public good.
IV. THE BENEFITS (NOT BURDENS) OF RENAMING
Abandoning the name "conservation easements" for a more functional and
descriptive alternative-perpetual and non-perpetual conservation restrictions-is
by no means a magic bullet that, without causing any harm, will cure the many
existing and potential problems faced by advocates of this legislative tool for
protecting environmentally, historically, and architecturally significant properties
75 Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage Grp., Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
76 Id. at 1306.77 Id. at 1307.
78 See 9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, § 64A.04[1] ("Other courts held
that small or invisible air pollutants were not a direct invasion of a possessory interest, and
thus denied a recovery in trespass for damage resulting from such pollutants.").
79 Elton, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1397 (citing Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1566 n.6).
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and structures. Nevertheless, a simple nomenclature change may very well yield
three meaningful benefits with no measurable burden other than the energy
lawmakers and , their staffs will expend making ever-so-slight statutory
emendations.
A. Avoiding Term Creep and Boomerangs
The first advantage of the name change-specifically substituting the word
"restrictions" for "easements" or "servitudes"-is that lawmakers will be sending
courts an even clearer message that their work product is unique and a thing apart,
despite its consanguinity with traditional easements, covenants, and equitable
servitudes. This alone should go a long way toward slowing down term creep
(though probably not stopping it dead in its tracks)80 and helping to prevent future
instances of the boomerang phenomenon. Moreover, lawyers and laypersons alike
will understand from the nomenclature itself that owners of lands affected by
perpetual conservation restrictions have yielded some rights to use and develop
their property that they would otherwise possess.
B. Associating Legislative Provenance with the Public Interest
The second benefit of the name change, specifically identifying the
restrictions as "perpetual" in duration and for "conservation" (and related)
purposes only, is that lawyers, judges, and, perhaps more importantly, the general
public will be informed or reminded that in authorizing this new real property
instrument the state legislature's overriding goal was the protection of society's
interest in preserving for as long as possible sensitive lands and important,
vulnerable structures from harmful exploitation and destruction.
C. Disconnecting Hybrids from Traditional Rules
that Inhibit Adaptation to Profound, Unanticipated Changes
Finally, it is hoped that distancing PCRs from easement terminology will
disentangle them from common law rules that pose a threat to the PCR's ability to
adapt to profound alterations, such as shifting critical habitat attributable to climate
change. Unlike traditional easements, covenants, and equitable servitudes, whose
termination.would only in rare instances result in significant negative externalities
for the general public, the vast majority of PCRs are specifically designed chiefly
to avoid those results. Therefore, to allow for the termination of this protection
so There still could be a problem with the use of the term "restrictions." See, e.g.,
Kepple v. Dohrmann, 60 A.3d 1031 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (misapplying easement law to
what the court called "conservation easements" even when they were actually named
"restrictions").
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solely because the label it carries "sounds in" traditional servitudes law would,
with excuses to the Bard, be a termination devoutly not to be wished."
81 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act III, sc. I ("'Tis a consummation.
Devoutly to be wish'd.").
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